The under-representation of women in parliaments worldwide warrants attention at the underlying sources. This study examines one potential source: the countries' constitutions.
INTRODUCTION
An important expression of agency is having a voice in society and influencing policy (World Bank 2011). However, women currently have less input than men in decision making in their communities and societies as they are heavily underrepresented in politics and government, especially in its upper reaches. Countries have made slow but significant progress on Millennium Development Goal 3, of "promoting gender equality and empowering women" (United Nations 2015). However, in many countries, gender inequality persists and women continue to face discrimination in political decision-making. As of 2014, only 39 countries (20.9 per cent of countries globally) had met the target set by the U.N. Economics and Social Council in 1990 of having 30 per cent or more women in national legislative seats (World Bank 2014) . Addressing this important gender gap in agency will require a continuous and proactive policy commitment to gender equality. And the development of new policy will require a strong evidence base that incorporates recent advances in knowledge and makes use of available data and indicators. This paper investigates the available knowledge and data on a key aspect of the current barriers to women's agency: their under-representation in parliamentary decisionmaking. This expression of agency is important to women's lives, with current evidence indicating that women's representation in parliament influences policies in ways that are more relevant to the preferences of women (e.g. Sonia Bhalotra and Irma Clots-Figueras 2014; Raghabendra Chattopadhyay and Esther Duflo 2004) . However, the legislative and other factors that influence women's parliamentary representation are poorly understood. This paper's particular focus is on the role of formal legal institutions in enhancing women's agency through parliamentary representation. We pursue the idea that constitutional protection from gender-based discrimination can bolster women's exercise of agency, by formalizing their individual and collective rights and providing them with frameworks to exercise their voice (World Bank 2012).
As such, the paper pursues some important themes of recent feminist legal and political scholarship. Helen Irving (2008, 1) , for example, argues that a country's constitution has gender impacts partly because it frames "women's membership of, or absence from, the constitutional community." Posing the rhetorical question "what do women want from a constitution?", Irving (2008, 21) responds that, amongst other things, women want full opportunities for participation, and access to political positions and public office.
Beverly Barnes and Ruth Rubio-Marin (2005, 7-8) express a similar perspective.
They observe that women who are active in feminist movements have begun to identify constitutions and constitutional change as relevant to our lives. They observe a number of important reasons for this, including the capacity that constitutional rights provide to women to challenge state activity in the courts, the visibility of constitutional provisions, and the tendency for constitutional rights to 'permeate' the general legal culture. Adele Cassola, Amy Raub, Danielle Folet and Jody Heymann (2014, 202) add to this list of reasons for feminist scholars to pay attention to constitutions, noting that constitutional gender protections can be leveraged to: …oppose the passage of discriminatory legislation, litigate against existing laws and practices that violate women's rights, challenge customary and religious traditions that restrict gender equality, and encourage the passage of new legislation that promotes equal rights for women.
It is interesting to note in this context then that although there has been a substantial history of women's involvement in constitutional design, and gender analysis has been applied to a range of countries' constitutions, there is scant literature on the broad, cross-national principles of constitutional design (see Irving, 2008, 28) . Indeed, Barnes and Rubio-Marin (2005, 2) identify "a huge gap -a gender gap -in contemporary constitutional analysis." Barnes and Rubio-Marin (2005) attempted to redress this gap in the literature by examining the constitutions and constitutional jurisprudence in twelve countries (Australia, Canada, Colombia, Cost Rica, France, Germany, India, Israel, South Africa, Spain, Turkey, and the United States). Georgina Waylen (2006) The conclusions of each of these studies identify the important role that constitutions can play in protecting and enhancing gender rights. However, each of the studies have also emphasised that the effects of constitutional change on women's rights is likely to depend heavily on the conditions and context of the change, including the country's legal traditions, its constitutional hermeneutics, and the presence of key participants who are open to gender concerns and prepared to take them on board. A common assessment is that whilst constitutional gender protections should not be viewed as a panacea for gender inequality, they do represent a valuable tool that can be used in the struggle for greater equality.
Our study contributes new empirical evidence on the relationship between constitutional gender provisions and gender equality by contributing a broad, cross-country overview of the relationship between constitutional anti-discrimination provisions and women's parliamentary representation. We provide the first empirical evidence in support of the argument that constitutional design is an important institutional factor promoting women's political agency. Furthermore, we show that the entrenchment of a protection from gender-based discrimination in such a fundamental document as a country's constitution, gives rise to additional institutional factors previously shown to contribute to women's parliamentary representation.
LITERATURE ON WOMEN'S PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION
Our study also builds on a relatively large empirical literature on the determinants of women's parliamentary representation. A range of empirical studies has sought to explain cross-national variations in the numbers of women elected to parliament. They have largely converged around three sets of factors: socio-economic, institutional and cultural (see, for example, Pamela Paxton, Sheri Kunovich and Melanie M. Hughes 2007, for a review). To date, however, the role of constitutional protection from discrimination has not been examined as an institutional factor promoting women's parliamentary representation.
Socio-economic factors are often regarded as the "supply-side" of politics (e.g. Vicky Randall 1987; Pippa Norris 1997) and are thought to influence the pool of potential female politicians. Explanations traditionally have focused on the levels of economic development and women's socio-economic status. Economic development can contribute to women's increased involvement in the public sphere through a number of mechanisms. First, economic development generally leads to a change in the nature of available jobs that are more conducive to women's paid work (e.g. Claudia Goldin 2006a; Claudia Goldin 2006b ).
Second, if economic development helps to liberate women from housework (e.g. Jeremy Greenwood, Ananth Seshadri and Mehmet Yorukoglu 2005) and results in new patterns of their fertility (e.g. Grant Miller 2010) , it can help women achieve greater independence and improve their capacity to pursue political careers. According to Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart (2001) , the first phase of industrialization sees significant advances in women's educational attainment and their participation in representative government; they gain greater political influence in the second, post-industrial phase. However, not all types of economic development promote gender equality. Michael L. Ross (2008) , in particular, argues that when economic development is based on oil and mineral extraction, it discourages women from entering the labour force and reduces their political representation. The role of the electoral system appears to be more certain, with proportional representation systems generally thought to be more conducive than plurality/majority systems to increasing women's representation (see, for example, Richard E. Matland 2005, for a detailed discussion). Proportional representation systems often have higher district magnitudes, which facilitate women's inclusion since the number of members elected per district increases, and closed party lists, which enable parties to place women in higher rank orders (e,g. Mona Lena Krook 2010). Finally, gender quotas are increasingly seen as an important instrument to achieve balanced gender representation in politics. As Esther Duflo (2012) argues, "…in the absence of affirmative action of some sort, it would be very difficult for women to break into politics". 
Variables
The set of variables used in the baseline regressions, together with details on their measurement and sources is outlined in the first two columns of Table 1 WBL provides information on whether a "non-discrimination clause covering gender or sex" is present in a country's constitution. Based on this information we define a variable constitutional protection that takes on the value of 1 "if the constitution explicitly includes gender or sex as protected categories for non-discrimination" and 0 if "there is no nondiscrimination provision, or if there is a non-discrimination provision that does not include gender or sex as a protected category" (International Finance Corporation and World Bank 2012). This variable is defined based on the data from 2011, the latest year for which data on other variables used in our study are available for a large sample of countries. In our sample of 106 countries, 67 per cent have such constitutional protection.
To single out the effect of constitutional protection on women's parliamentary representation, our analysis incorporates controls for a number of other potential determinants. We attempt to include measures of the variables identified as important in previous studies. However, we also select from the list to avoid the danger of overcontrolling, given that some of these variables may be endogenous to constitutional protection. In particular, we do not include measures of women's education and labour market status, or the presence of gender quotas, as these are potentially left-hand side variables with respect to constitutional protection and may also be mechanisms by which constitutional protection affects women's parliamentary representation. Therefore, we would be estimating the effect of constitutional protection on women's parliamentary representation other than its effect through these variables, if they were included in the model. Leaving these variables out is necessary to obtain an estimate of the total effect of constitutional protection on women's parliamentary representation. Table 5 .
In an additional set of results reported in 
Estimation approach
We test the hypothesis that constitutional protection from gender-based discrimination will bolster women's parliamentary representation by estimating regressions of the following form:
where indices countries; is the share of parliamentary seats in a single or lower chamber held by women; is a dummy for a country whose constitution has a non- constitutional protection and other controls at the start of that period. This approach helps to diminish the likelihood of reverse causation. In a further step, we address the concerns over endogeneity directly, by means of IV estimation. We hypothesize that the comprehensiveness of a constitution in terms of the total number of rights provisions could be a valid instrument for the provision on non-discrimination on the basis of gender. We discuss this instrumental variable strategy and demonstrate its validity in the robustness checks section.
An alternative approach to deal with the problem of endogeneity would be to use a panel data analysis of constitutional protection and women's representation in parliament.
Having more than one observation for a country, we could control for time invariant 
RESULTS

Descriptive statistics
In the last three columns of Table 1 , we report the descriptive statistics (means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum values) of all the variables included in our baseline analysis. Table 2 
Baseline model
We further examine the relationship between constitutional protection and women's parliamentary representation through a regression analysis. In column (1) of Table 3 (4), where we include continent dummy variables to control for differences in geographic location, this variable is no longer a statistically significant factor. The estimated coefficient on constitutional protection with and without continent dummies are essentially identical suggesting that it is not only identified from broad differences across different parts of the world, but from finer within-region variation.
Our estimates on constitutional protection are not only statistically significant they are also economically meaningful. Based on the estimates in column (4), comparing countries similar in a wide range of socio-economic, institutional and cultural characteristics and located within the same world regions, women's share of parliamentary seats is, on average, 3.5 percentage points higher in countries with constitutional protection from gender-based discrimination. This is equal to 18.1 per cent of the sample mean for women in parliament and 33.5 per cent of its standard deviation.
Robustness checks
We first consider the robustness of our results to influential observations. These are observations that, if deleted, could substantially alter important features of the analysis. We apply two standard rules to identifying the potentially influential observations. In column (1) of Table 4 , we use the DFITS measure, which captures changes in the OLS slopes as individual observations are dropped from the sample, whereas in column (2) we use the DFBETA measure, which assesses how individual coefficients change as observations are Next, we consider the robustness of the results to using alternative sets of control variables. While widely used, GDP per capita is by no means a perfect measure of economic development. Since the literature predominantly regards socio-economic variables as the "supply-side" of politics (e.g. Vicky Randall 1987; Pippa Norris 1997) , the use of GDP per capita measure in baseline models controls for distributional effects. To allow for the possibility that economic development can also be a "demand-side" variable, we additionally control for the level of GDP (column (3) of Table 4 ). The estimated coefficient on constitutional protection remains robust to this change in the set of socio-economic controls.
The coefficients on Ln GDP per capita and Ln GDP terms are insignificant under this specification. Additionally, we consider the use of GNI instead of GDP as our measure of economic development to allow for the possibility that the material wellbeing of the residents of a country, along with foreign income, affects the key relationships. We re-estimate models with GNI per capita (and its squared term) (column (4)); and GNI per capita and level of GNI (column 5) used as our measures of economic development. The estimated coefficients on constitutional protection change remarkably little compared to the baseline estimates. The estimated coefficients on the GNI terms are insignificant.
We also consider the robustness of the results to using alternative measures of women's political representation as the dependent variable. Our baseline model is based on cross-sectional data in 2011. One concern with this approach is that it increases the likelihood of reverse causation. This issue is unlikely to be a substantial problem as less than a third out of the sample of 100 countries for which there is data recorded a change in their constitutions However, the estimated standard error is large, yielding the coefficient statistically insignificant. This potentially suggests that while constitutional provisions contribute to the advancement of women into parliaments, they do not raise the glass ceiling for women in politics to the degree that would enable their representation in ministerial cabinet positionsa possibility that needs to be validated by future research.
Addressing endogeneity
The results so far suggest a positive effect of constitutional protection on women's representation in parliament. However, while including a large set of controls likely mitigates the effect of unobserved heterogeneity, the estimated coefficient on constitutional protection may still remain biased if this set is not exhaustive. The possibility of reverse causation (with women's representation in parliament potentially leading to constitutions favourable to women) has also not been fully discounted. Here we directly address the issue of bias in our estimates by using an instrumental variable for identification. To be valid, such instrument needs to be correlated with constitutional protection but uncorrelated with women in parliament, except through the variables we control for.
The protection clauses on gender-based discrimination should be more commonly found in constitutions containing a large number of different human rights provisions.
Motivated by this conjecture, we use the number of rights provisions contained in a country's constitution as an instrument (sourced from Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg and James Melton 2014). We re-estimate the relationship between constitutional protection and women in parliament using 2SLS regression. The first stage is reported in column (1) of Table 5 Moreover, they are higher in magnitude suggesting negative bias in our baseline estimates.
Based on the Hausman test results reported at the bottom of Column (3), we reject the null hypothesis that constitutional protection is exogenous. This underscores the importance of addressing the endogeneity of constitutional protection in determining its effect on women's parliamentary representation.
The exclusion restriction implied by our IV regression is that, conditional on the controls included in the regression, rights provisions contained in a country's constitution have no effect on women in parliament, other than their effect through constitutional protection. We investigate the validity of this restriction by using a simple over-identification test. If the model is over-identified with more excluded instruments than included endogenous variables, we are able to test whether the excluded instruments are independent of the error term. To than end we add an indicator of whether the rights are included in a separate heading/document (rather than being incorporated into various parts) of a constitution as an additional instrument for constitutional protection. We use Hansen J statistic to test the null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term.
The over-identification test and the related results are reported in Table 5 . In column (2) we report the first stage results using two instruments, while column (4) reports the corresponding second stage estimates of the effect of constitutional protection on women's representation in parliament, which remains positive and significant. The results of the overidentification test appear at the bottom of column (4). The Hansen J test has a p-value of 0.33, failing to reject the null hypothesis. We therefore conclude that the test does not yield any evidence for a direct effect of our instrument on women in parliament.
As an additional test for the validity of the exclusion restriction implied by our IV regression, we conduct an easy-to-interpret informal test of exogeneity of number of rights, by directly regressing it against women in parliament. Column (5) Table (5) show, women in labour force is statistically significantly linked to women's share in parliament. However, its inclusion produces only a modest drop in the constitutional protection coefficient. This also suggests limited scope for the possibility that constitutional protection increases women's parliamentary representation by simply increasing the number of women who work outside the home.
Transmission mechanisms
Our finding on the positive effect of constitutional protection on women's parliamentary representation raises a number of important questions, especially about the reasons for the effect. We can suggest several. First, entrenchment of a provision against gender-based discrimination in a constitution may lead to an increased political representation of women directly through the electoral mechanism. For example, the provision may put extra pressure on political parties to have female candidates on their lists, and it may result in more resources and capacity for women to launch political careers and get elected. Second, a change in a country's political culture may result, leading to more favourable electoral outcomes for women not only through the increased supply of female candidates but also through increased participation of female voters and more votes given to female candidates.
As Helen Irving (2005, 21) argues, constitutional provisions make important symbolic statements and help name disadvantage. In doing so they can create important impetus for positive change.
In most cases, however, constitutions rarely contain a lot of instrumental details but rather provide guidance on the type of decisions to be made. In the words of Peter C. Ordeshook (1993: 231f) : "A constitution is not a piece of legislation; it is the mechanism people use to guide the formulation of legislation and law." To shed light on this issue we conduct two additional empirical explorations. Table 6 , suggest that having constitutional protection increases the probability of introducing quotas by 32.8 percentage points.
Second, we consider whether laws on non-discrimination in hiring practices on the basis of gender are also more likely to be found in places with constitutional protection (here our data come from the International Finance Corporation and World Bank 2012). In our estimation sample, 73.1 per cent of countries do have such laws. As the results reported in column (2) of Table 6 demonstrate, countries with constitutional protection have a 17.7
percentage point higher probability of having these laws. Therefore, it appears that the adoption of legislation targeting women's under-representation is a potentially important mechanism linking constitutions with women's political representation.
CONCLUSION
Based on a large cross-country dataset, this study has shown that women's representation in parliament is larger in countries with constitutional protection from gender-based discrimination. Our baseline estimates suggest that the presence of such protection results in over a three and a half percentage point increase in women's share of parliamentary seats.
Our more detailed analysis of this data show that places with constitutional protection from gender-based discrimination are likely to have legislations directly targeting women's underrepresentation.
These results underscore the role of constitutional design in promoting women's political agency and suggest that constitutional building processes offer some opportunities to enhance and protect women's agency. Our findings thus support existing case study evidence that suggests that constitutional provisions are an important part of the institutional structure influencing gender rights. This does not deny that a constitution, however progressive, will not guarantee gender equity. The presence of enforcement mechanisms, political finance and access to campaign funding are amongst a myriad factors affecting the ability to translate constitutional gender provisions into improved rates of women's representation in parliament.
However, the constitutional provisions are an important part of this puzzle. As Helen Irving (2008, 21) , argues, the wording of a constitution is of 'immense significance':
A well-designed constitution is better that one that is poorly designed, and a constitution that is well designed and also sensitive to the goals of gender equity, equity, and agency, is better still.
Thus, the struggle to protect and enhance women's agency should incorporate constitutional/legal strategies wherever they are possible. Constitutional protection from gender-based discrimination appears to be an important part of an enabling framework for the development of improved policies -and the achievement of better outcomes for women. With the passage of time, greater levels of constitutional change are likely to be measured 6 , and this will create further opportunities for empirical studies of the gender effects of constitutional provisions. Note -N=106; All variables are defined as of 2011 unless explicitly specified otherwise. Note -N=106; All variables are defined as of 2011 unless explicitly specified otherwise. (1) excludes observations based on DFITS; (2) excludes observations based on DFBETA. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis; * denotes significance at 10 per cent level, ** at 5 per cent level, *** at 1 per cent level. 46 Note -Number of rights is the number of rights provisions contained in a constitution. Section on rights is a dummy for constitutions where the rights are included in a separate heading/document rather than being incorporated into various parts. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis; * denotes significance at 10 per cent level, ** at 5 per cent level, *** at 1 per cent level. Note -Number of rights (defined in the note for Table 5 ) is used as an instrument. Average marginal effects are reported. Standard errors are in parenthesis; * denotes significance at 10 per cent level, ** at 5 per cent level, *** at 1 per cent level.
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